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Does the Price of the British Pound Reflect
its True Value?
by Katherine Calhoun
Introduction
T he old saying "The sun never sets on the
Britis h empi re;' indicated an optimism o n the
part of the British people. It' s a pit y that
forme r optimism is now missing in the British
currency. Since the early 1980s, the British
pound has been trading mostly on the
dow nside with some wide swings in its value.
This volatili ty in ster lin g seems to have been
heig htened by the 1979 discovery of oi l in the
No rth Sea, mostly beca use currency traders
fe lt Britain's economy was tied to the price of
oil.
Perhaps during the late 1970s a nd ea rl y
1980s, oil's price may have dictated the value
o f the British pound. According to Stevenson
a nd Jennings (1984), the strength or weakness
o f the British economy is reflected in the value
of the British pound. Therefore, the pound
should be reflecting oil's diminished role in the
economy, but it is not.

Oil's Role in the British Economy

which worked well during the high oil price
years of the late 1970s and early 1980s. BNOC
co ntributed more than $15 billion a nnuall y to
Britain's Treasury (Fleming 1984). Oil sales,
royalties, and taxes co mpri sed roughly 6 pe rcent of the Gross Domestic Product (G DP)
(Skapinker 1985).
But the bubble burst in 1984 when oil prices
began to decline. The BNOC paid a fixed price
for North Sea oil and then had to sell it on
a declining spot oil market because it had adjusted its market prices too slowly. The BNOC
lost nearly $52 million that year (Skapinker
1985). If subsidizing the BNOC wasn't
enough , the British Treasury also lost nearly
400 million pounds in revenue for each dollar
drop in the price of oil (Hogg 1984).
The loss of revenue resulting from the drop
in oil prices was offset by the depreciation in
sterling. Sterling lost 5 cents for each one
dollar decline in oil prices (Hogg 1984). Thus,
the favorable exchange rate allowed Britain to
continue to increase oil exports to the industrial world.

Up to mid-1976, Great Britain was entirely
dependent on imported oi l, suffering the same
balance of payments problems as other oildependent nations. Following the discovery of
oil in the North Sea, however, Britain became
a net exporter of oil in 1980. North Sea oil productio n steadi ly increased (as industrial nations preferred Britain's free market policy to
that of OPEC) to an output of 2.6 million barrels per day in 1986. The estimated cost of product ion ranged from $4 to $8 per barrel for
North Sea oil (Norman 1985).

In January 1985, economists believed Great
Britain cou ld weather the decline in oil prices
as long as the oi l price did not drop below $25
per barrel. If prices fell below $25, many
analysts believed the British economy would
probably be devastated (Skapinker 1985).

To take advantage of the oil situation, the
Britis h government controlled the oil industry
through the establishment of the British National Oil Company (BNOC), an arrangement

The continued slide in oil prices, due to
slackness in world demand and due to
cheating by OPECmembers on their production quotas, caused the British government to

Most currency traders agreed. Therefore,
currency traders would sell sterling in reaction
to the decline in the price of oil. Speculators
also jumped on the selling band wagon,
creating a somewhat destabilizing situation for
the pound in the foreign exchange market.
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creased costs while the stagnant industries cannot. Therefore, stagnant industries contract to
lessen costs.
"Dutch disease;' a nd not Prime Minister
Margaret Thatcher's policies, can be blamed
for the high unemployment in the Brit ish
manufacturing sector. Indeed, when Thatcher
came to power in 1979, she departed from her
predecessor's policies, and inflation fell to its
lowest level since the 1960s. On the other hand,
unemployment rose to its highest level since
the 1930s. Job losses were borne entirely in the
manufacturing sector. Manufacturing accounted for 28 percent of the workforce in
1979, and by 1982, manufacturing jobs had
fallen by 1.5 million. The Manufacturing Production Index also fell from 112 in 1979 to 96
in 1983 (Chrystal 1984).
Thatcher's critics claimed this divergence
was a result of the tight aggregate demand
created by the restrictiveness of her monetarist
policies. However, in comparing Thatcher's
policies to her predecessor's, T hatcher's
monetary policy was not a ny tighter than in
previous recessions, and her predecessor's
1975-78 fiscal policy was tighter than that of

divorce itself from the oi l business. In March
1985 , Britain eliminated the BNOC. The
British government also reduced its 32 percent
stake in the British Petroleum Company and
so ld it s North Sea acreage to Britain PLC and
Enterprise Oil Company.

The Dutch Disease Phenomenon
Oil may have played a more important role
in the British economy than first indicated. Oil
actually caused profound structural changes
in the British economy from the late I 970s to
the current time which either gave rise to problems for the manufacturing sector and / or exacerbated existing problems. Economists refer
to this phenomenon as the "Dutch disease;'
Dutch disease results from the stress placed on internal economic structures as experienced by the Netherlands during the 1970s.
All industries share a pool of resources, such
as labor and raw materials. If one industry
grows rapidly, it bids up prices and draws the
resources away from the other industries. The
growi ng industry can afford to pass on the in-

Figure 1
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T hatcher's first th ree years in power.
Therefore, this was not a valid explanation of
the manufacturing sector's decline.
Others in Britain believed the world-wide
recession affected the British manufacturing
sector more negatively than other sectors
because Britain annually exported 25 percent
of its G DP (Chrystal 1984). This reasoning
seemed plausible, yet Britain's manufacturing
decli ne preceded the world recession by several
months.
There fore, Thatcher's rise to power was not
the important event; it was the rise in the price
of oil. The British economy went through major structural changes caused by the production o f North Sea oil. These changes went into fu ll swing as oil prices rose and as Thatcher was elected.
Although all sectors were competing for
limited resources, the booming oil sector drew
resources away from the manufacturing sector, pushing the cost of these resources up.
While the booming oil sector cou ld afford to
pass o n these extra costs, the manufacturing
sector could not and was forced to lower product ion. Figure I depicts the balance of trade
probelms between the oil and manufacturing
sec tors.

The changes in the economy produced a
trade balance tipped in favor of oil. Based on
the economic theory of "Dutch disease;' Britain' s prices rose, and the exchange rate appreciated as foreign importers demanded more
pounds to pay for British oil. As the pound's
value increased, the price of Britain' s
manufactured goods rose relative to other
countries'. Notice on Figure 2, the Purchasing Power Parity (PPP) chart, that the pound's
exchange rate moved higher than its PPP band
would indicate. PPP did trend slightly higher
during this time due to the price increases.
(PPP is a short cut method of estimating the
equ ilibrium exchange rate when a nation has
a Balance of Payments problem. The exchange
rate can be estimated by using a domestic price
index/ foreign price index ratio.)
As a result of "Dutch disease;' oil exports
increased at the expense of manufactured
goods; therefore, the manufacturing sector
became less competitive in the world market
which led to its contraction. Other new oil
countries exhibited this same effect.
The "Dutch disease" process could possibly
be reversed. Currently, oil does not play as important a role in Britain as it previously did.
The British government is continuing to divest
itself of oil related businesses as oil prices are

Figure 2
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declining. Perhaps underlying the deemphasis
on the oil sector is the prediction that Britain
will run out of oil by the end of the century
and the realization that ma nufacturing must
improve to compensate for the lack o f oi l
revenue.
British manu facturers are again becoming
competitive, with the exchange rates somewhat
depressed and the oil sector losing steam. During I985, real rates of return in the nonoil
British sector returned to the levels of the
1960s, and profits rose 21 percent.

Other Factors Affecting Sterling's Value
Other factors besides the "Dutch disease"
phenomenon and the dominance of oil in the
British economy also affected the value of the
pound.
Currency traders' perceptions

Most analysts believe that prices of oil and
the pound move directly together. Then why
did the British pound move lower as the price
of oil rose during the early 1980s and begin
to recover as the price of oil fell to around $11
per barrel?
The pound bottomed near $1.03 in JanuaryMarch 1985, about the time the British government eliminated the BNOC. Some currency

specialists confirmed that without ·t he drain
of the BNOC on the British Treasury, the
government could begin stimulating the
economy. Sterling then began to move higher.
Probably the most im portant factor explaining the discrepancy between crude's fall and
the pound's rise was the turnaround in the
value of the U.S. dollar. The Group of Five
(G-5) 1 industrial nations meeting in late
September 1985 effectively weakened the value
of the dollar and shifted currency traders' attention to the other major currencies. Since
then, the British pound has appreciated;
however, the pound has lagged its other major currency counterparts. One reason for this
lag is that sterling has not completely shaken
off the fluctuations in the oil market. Since
the continued decline in the price of oil undermined favorable sentiment towards sterling,
traders shifted their money to the currencies
showing the best potential for gains. Table 1
shows the appreciation of the four major currency futures and the depreciation in oil.
Going into the first high in December 1985,
the British pound held up relatively well
against the other currencies, but it was then
left behind. As other currencies rose in value
into 1986, the British pound actually fell 8.5
percent compared to the other currencies as

Tab le 1

A ppreciation of Major Currencies and the Depreciation of Oil fro m the G-5
Meeting to March 1986

Appreciation (depreciation) from:
G-5 meeting to
1st hi gh
June Swiss franc
June Japanese yen
June Deutschemark
June British pound
Crude oil

14.5%
11.0
12.8
9.0
(38.5)

G-5 to 1986
high
27 %
28
27
12
(57 .7)

Source: Commodit y Price Charts, March 28, 1986, and author 's calculations
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a result of plummeting crude oil prices.
However, recent favorable remarks about the
British economy and a tax cut in the face of
falling crude prices have changed the perceptions of some currency traders . T hese traders
have bough t the British pound because they
believe sterli ng is now undervalued.
Fiscal policy
As oil prices continued falling to $15 a barrel in early 1986, the British Treasury lost 5
billion pounds of expected oil revenue (International Bank Credit Analyst 1986). Most
British government officials believe the oil
price, now around $11 a barrel, will come back
to settle near $15 per barrel. Even at that price,
few international analysts felt Britain could afford to cut taxes and contain government
borrowing.

But on March 18, 1986, Britain did just that.
The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel
Lawson, surprised the world and offered 1
billion pounds in income tax cuts to the public
with the expectation that government borrowing would be kept to less than 2 percent of
G DP (Norman 1986). The British government
could slash taxes because of the following four
fi nancial facto rs: public expenditure growt h
had slowed; the economic expansion had caused nonoil tax revenues to be above expectations; privatization of state industries brought
in al most double the previous year's revenue;
and nationalized industries' financial needs
fell in the last five years (International Bank
Credit Analyst 1986). This meant that the
British government could survive without the
5 billion pounds of lost oil revenue.
Even though oil makes up 6 percent of Britain's economic output, the benefits of
cheaper oil to the other 94 percent of Britain's
GDP should offset the drop in oil revenues to
the Treasury. Chancellor Lawson hoped that
as nonoil corporate profits rose, so would consumer spending and economic activity.
Therefore, he could cut taxes without increasing the budget deficit.
Monetary policy
British interest rates had fallen in conjunc-
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tion with the other industrial nations: Long
term bonds were around 9 percent during 1986
and short term rates fell to 11.5 percent.
One problem Britain has had is the growth
of its money supply. Its broad money measure
was targeted to grow at 5 percent to 9 percent
during 1985, but it actually grew at 14.5 percent. Lawson believed the money supply
growth was due to the growth in private lending, the Bank of England paying some of its
debts, and the attractiveness of high interest
money deposits. The 1986 target was 11 to 15
percent with currency traders believing that the
British government would not hike interest
rates to slow money growth (International
Bank Credit Analyst 1986).
To keep inflation in check with the easier
monetary policy, Lawson had modest targets
in mind for narrow money growth, a falling
rate of growth of money GDP, and planned
to hold exchange rates higher by keeping interest rates high.
Capital inflows

Britain had maintained high interest rates
to squeeze out inflation and maintain the exchange rate. Britain's interest rates had been
some of the highest of the indust rial nations
during 1986. The British base lending rate,
which is like the U.S. discount rate, was pegged at 11 percent, and inflation in Britain was
expected to range from 3 to 5 percent for 1986
(Norman 1986). This left investors with a real
rate of return of 6 to 8 percent. The U.S.,
which had held the best real rate of return, offered only about a 3.5 percent return on investors' money during early 1986. Eurosterling offered returns of up to four percentage
points more than Eurodollars.
The higher Brit ish rate of return, plus the
better economic news, is allowing capital to
flow into Great Britain. As economic theory
suggests, capital flows to the area with the
highest rate of return. This inflow creates an
increse in the demand for British securities and
an increase in demand for sterling. If the supply of sterling remains unchanged and demand
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rises, the exchange rate appreciates. Currency
traders maintained in April 1986 that even if
Great Britain dropped rates another 1.5 percent, a favorable interest rate differential would
still exist. Hence, the pound has been favored
on downsticks in crude oil, according to
several currency traders on the International
Monetary Market in Chicago.
Loss in comparative advantage

Britain apparently has lost its comparative
advantage in the production of many products
such as coal, steel, shipbuilding, textiles, cars,
trucks, and telecommunications.
Why has Britain lost that advantage? The
explanation rests with " English disease' :._the
unwillingness to change.
English disease has been around for decades
and its roots are in the class system of Britain.
This class system incorporates these ideas:
a generational decrease in entrepreneurial
spirit; social prejudices against manufaccuring and trade with a bias favoring liberal
over technical education; failure to apply
science and technology to trade; concentration on traditional and easy, but slower
growing markets; complacent management
and obstructive trade unions; industrial
relations poisoned by class discrimination
and resistance to change all around.
(Jenkins 1985)

The widespread incorporation of these
beliefs throughout Britain has rendered Britain uncompetitive with the rest of the world.
Even though the '' Dutch disease' ' explanation
of the shifting of resources from British
manufacturing to the North Sea oil sector explains much of the decline in the manufacturing sector, the impact of these long term inefficiencies in quality of British management,
working practices, product design, and training and educat ion cannot be ignored
(Jenkins 1985). The boon of North Sea oil only seemed to mask these inherent weaknesses
in the British economy.
Margaret Thatcher was the first politician
to recognize and address the issue of "English

disease: '

Margaret Thatcher dreams of Britain
becoming an enterprise society on the
American model, but we aren 't the US. and
never can be. We are a small, homogenous
island society with a long and heavy past.
(Jen kins 1985)

Britain's decline took place over decades and
cannot be changed overnight. However, attitudes are changing, and some evidence exists that Britain is attempting to arrest the
"English disease:' Thatcher has shaken up
many facets of British life during the 1980s.
The hold of trade unions on the British
economy is weakening, and a change in attitudes toward the unions' role in society is occurring. The recent recession and the development of new technology has hastened attitude
changes toward the unions and toward liberal
arts education.
As a result of these changes toward a more
liberalized economy, Britain has become one
of the fastest growing economies in Europe.
The nationwide productivity rate is rising
faster than at any time since World War II;
company profits have increased 20 percent a
year; and per capita income growth has topped most industrial nations ' rankings. Inflation remains low, around 3 to 5 percent, and
industrial investment is at a peak. Additionally, business starts are at a record (Brady 1985).
All of these facts provided further evidence for
confidence in the British pound.

Conclusion
Where does this leave the value of the
pound?
As it became an important industry, oil
caused some distortions in the structure of the
British economy. The oil sector gained at the
expense of other sectors, most notably the
manufacturing sector. This created an overvalued exchange rate.
The current evidence on stimulative
monetary and fi scal measures for the British
economy, its attempt to regain its comparative
advantage, and the inflow of capital, suggest
that the British pound is undervalued, primari-
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ly due to oil's influence. Even though oil
should not be given that much consideration
in the British economy, changing currency
traders' minds is difficult. Sterling is trading
below its PPP band. Since the exchange rate
should reflect a nation's PPP, the pound needs
to rise. Sterling shou ld be able to move to its
recent historical level, around $2 per pound,
which reflects its true value. As of April 1987,
the British pound was at $1.65 .

Note
1T he G-5 are the Treasury Secretaries from the five leading
indu stri a l nations who periodically meet to discuss exchange rate stabil it y. The five industrial nations include
the U.S. , G reat Britain, France, West Germany, and Japan .
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